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equivalent of a fair percentage in cash. The Delaware courts, however, have
subsequently refused to interpret the appraisal right in the light of the protective function it was meant to fulfil, and instead have treated it as if it presented
only a routine problem of valuation. If the dissenting shareholder is to be given
an equivalent in cash of his interest in the corporation it would seem that the
fairest standard would be his liquidation interest in the net worth of the corporation as a going concern. The courts, however, put the problem in the hands of
the appraisers with only the most general instructions to make use of all available factors." The appraisers juggle the various value elements, such as market
value, book value, and capitalized earnings, but they must especially allow for
the fact that the preferred shareholder is in no position to force the payment of
dividends to himself and that his interests are always vulnerable to depression
in a dummy merger. By thus emphasizing the weakness of the minority stockholder's position, the standards of appraisal used preclude any hope of protection for him.
As a practical matter the Delaware courts perhaps must refuse to allow real
protection for minority stockholders in appraisals because, if the appraisal right
were strengthened, many of the preferred shareholders might dissent, and recapitalizations by merger might become impossible. The revelation of the complete lack of protection afforded by appraisals would seem to make clear, however, that the Havender case 2 did involve a complete turnabout from the position taken in the Keller case, 3 and that the latter case's rule on charter amendments should be frankly abandoned; it shows in addition that if the cumulative
provisions in Delaware preferred stock are to have any meaning at all the courts
must scrutinize merger plans to insure that they result in fair distributions of
ownership in merged corporations.'4

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL RIGHTS IN EQUITY
The California Civil Code makes it unlawful for proprietors of places of public amusement to deny admission to those who have purchased and tendered
tickets of admission, and provides for the recovery of actual damages plus one
hundred dollars for each violation.' The plaintiff, who had been ejected from the
defendant's race-course, although he had paid admission and had conducted
himself properly, sought an injunction to prevent his being ejected in the future.
"xChicago Corp. v. Munds, 2o Del. Ch. 142, 172 Aft. 452 (1934). A similar position is taken
in other states. Matter of Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931); Republic Finance and
Investment Co. v. Fenstermaker, 211 Ind. 251, 6 N.E. 2d 541 (1937); Ahilenius v. Bunn &
Humphreys, Inc., 358 Il1. I55, 192 N.E. 824 (1934).
2 Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, ii A. 2d,33x (1940).
13 Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 29o At. i25 (1936).
'4 The situation is analogous to that involved in the judicial treatment of reorganization
plans a generation ago as discussed in Katz, The Protection of Minority Bondholders in Foreclosures and Receiverships, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. S17 (1936).
' Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) §§ 53, 54.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

The lower court refused to grant the injunction, but on appeal it was held that
the plaintiff was entitled to inijunctive relief, even though the statute did not so
specifically provide, and even though purely personal rights were involved.
Orloff v.Los Angeles Turf Club.2
In applying the criteria for injunctive relief, the court held that the remedy at
law was inadequate since such mental injury as the plaintiff here suffered can be
neither fully recompensed nor precisely measured3 The most significant aspect
of the decision, however, was the court's express holding that the injunctive
relief may be granted to protect personal as well as property rights.
Since Lord Eldon's dictum in Gee v. Prikhard,4the prevailing view has been
that the jurisdiction of equity extends only to-property rights. Equitable intervention to secure personal rights has been thought unnecessarysince the criminal
law served as an adequate deterrent against assault and batterys and since
negligence could hardly be enjoined.6 Furthermore, up until the turn of the
century, mental injury, unaccompanied by damage to property interests, was
not even actionable at law. Thus it may be argued that a dictum together with
long disuse, rather than sound policy reasons, have led to the generalization that
equity does not act upon purely personal rights.7
Advocates of the overthrow of the traditional doctrine have sought to distinguish the case law,8 Long, writing in 1923, urged that no case had actually
turned upon Lord Eldon's dictum, but that all cases which. denied injunctive
relief to prevent injuries to the personality could be distinguished.9 Indeed, by a
fair interpretation of the cases up to that time, either the fact situation presented no cognizable cause of action at law or in equity," or the remedy at law
could be said to be adequate and complete,"I or the particular conduct sought to
be enjoined constituted a crime and could be deterred by the threat of criminal
2 1o

P.

2d

321 (Cal., 1947).

3 Ibid. at 325.

4 "The question will be whether the bill has stated facts of which the court can take notice,
as a case of civil property, which it is bound to protect." 2 Swanst. 402, 413 (Ch. i818).
6
s Walsh, Equity § So (ig3o).
Ibid.
7Bispham, Principles of Equity 584, n. 2 (5th ed., 1893)-"But it is the rights of property
or, rather, rights in property, that equity interferes to protect. A party is not entitled to a writ
of injunction for a matter affecting his person." Kerr, Injunctions § i (2d ed., 188o).

8Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv. L.
Rev. 640 (I916); Long, Equitable Jurisdiction To Protect Personal Rights, 33 Yale L.J. II5
(1923); Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 407-14 (1919); 14 A.L.R. 286.
9Long, Equitable Jurisdiction To Protect Personal Rights, 33 Yale LJ.1i1, 117 (1923).
"0Hoyt v. MacKenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 320 (1848); Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed. 280 (D.C.
Mass., 1894); Hodecker v. Stricker, 39 N.Y. Supp. S's (i896); Schuler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434.
42 N.E. 22 (1895); Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372, 8o N.W. 285 (I899); Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 17I N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902); Owen v. Partridge, 4o N.Y.
Misc. 415, 82 N.Y. Supp. 248 (r9o3); Murray v. Cast Lithographic Co., 8 N.Y. Misc. 36, 28
N.Y. Supp. 271 (1894). Cf. Lawson v. Hewel, x8 Cal. 613, 5o Pac. 763 (x897).
21Chappel v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 Adt. 942 (1896); Ashinsky-v. Levenson, 256 Pa. x4,
iofAtl.49x (1917); Woolcott v. Shubert, 169 App. Div. 194, I54 N.Y. Supp. 643 (igis); White
v. Pasfield, 212 Ill. App. 73 (x9x8); Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54 (C.C.A. 2d, 1917;
Raymond v. Russell, 143 Mass. 295, 9 N.E. 544 (1887).
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prosecution," or injunctive relief conflicted with traditional freedoms and had
to be denied to promote the full exercise of those freedoms."s iMost of the cases
since 1923 can be similarly distinguished.'4
On the other hand there were a number of instances prior to 1923 in which
equity protected personal rights, s although these were at times disguised as
property rights.' 6 At the time Long wrote, however, no case had openly and
expressly overruled the dictum in Gee v. Prikhard. Since 1923, not only has
there been an increasing number of cases obliterating the distinction between
personal and property rights as a basis for equitable relief,17 but two courts
have expressly held that the distinction is no longer applicable, 8 the California
Court in the instant case and the Massachusetts Court in Kenyon v. City of
Chicopee.19According to these courts, equity mayprotect personal rights where it
appears " .... . that unless relief is granted a substantial right of the plaintiff
will be impaired to a material degree, that the remedy at law is inadequate, and
that injunctive relief can be applied with practical success and without imposing
an impossible burden on the court or bringing its process into disrepute."20
" Montgomery v. Walton, 14 Ala. 207 (1848); Woolcott v. Shubert, x69 App. Div. 194
154 N.Y. Supp. 643 (igis); White v. Pasfield, 212 II. App. 73 (rg:8).
1 Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 24 (839) (restraining a threatened libel held an
interference with freedom of the press); Daily v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 44 Pac. 458
(z896) (same); see Owen v. Partridge, 4o N.Y. Misc. 415, 82 N.Y. Supp. 248 (:903).
X4The complaints in two cases state no cause of action; Baumann v. Baumann 25o N.Y
382, 16s N.E. 8ig (1929); Jones v. Oklahoma City, 78 F. 2d 86o (C.C.A. ioth, 1935). In three
cases the remedy at law was probably adequate: Snedaker v. King, iii Ohio 225, 145 N.E. 15
(1924); Texas v. Grosjean, 16 F. Supp. 264 (La., 1936); Bank v. Bank, 18o Md. 254, 23 A. 2d
700 (1942). Two cases'probably cannot be distinguished: Smith v. Hamm, 181 S.W. 2d 475
(Ark., i944); Bartholomew v. Workman, 169 P. 2d 1o2 (Okla., 1946).
is Marks v. Jaffa, 6 N.Y. Misc. 290, 26 N.Y. Supp. 9o8 (893); Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex.
Crin. Rep. 413, 50 S.W. 933 (1899); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, iiS La. 479, 39 So. 499 (9o5);
Kirk v. Wyman, 83 S.C. 372, 65 S.E. 387 (i9o9); Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (Nev.,

1918).
x6 McKillopp v. Taylor, 25 N.J. Eq. 139 (1874); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 91o,
67 Atl. 97 (i9o7); New Method Laundry Co. v. McCann, 174 Cal. 26, 161 Pac. 99o (x9z6);
Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga, 227, 99 S.E. 86x (i9:9); Sherrard v. Henry, 88 W. Va. 315, xo6 S.E.
705 (192l).

17Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex., 1924); McGreery v. Miller's Grocetaria, 99 Colo.
499, 64 P. 2d 8o3 (1936); Reed v. Carter, 268 Ky. 1, 103 S.W. 2d 663 (937); Henley v. Rockett,
243 Ala. 172, 8 So. 2d 852 (1942); Hunt v. Hudgins, 168 S.W. 2d 703 (Tex., 1943); cf. Grand
Int.Brotherhood of Locom. Eng. v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P. 2d 971 (1934); cf. Stone v. Board
of Directors of City of Pasadena, 47 Cal. App. 2d 749, 118 P. 2d 866 (I94i).
isOrloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, z8o P. 2d 321 (Cal., 1947); Kenyon v. City of Chicopee,
70 N.E. 2d 241 (Mass., 1946).
19 70 N.E. 2d 241 (Mass., 1946).
2oIbid., at 244: "In reading the decisions holding or stating that equity will protect only
property rights, one is struck by the absence of any convincing reasons for such a sweeping
generalization. We are by no means satisfied that property rights and personal rights are always
as distinct and readily separable as much of the public discussion in recent years would have
them. But in so far as the distinction exists we cannot believe that personal rights recognized
by law are in general less important to the individual or less vital to society or less worthy of
protection by the peculiar remedies equity can afford than are property rights. We are im-
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It may be argued that the rationale of the California and the Massachusetts
courts has unduly enlarged the scope of the injunction and may lead to abuse
as in the early history of labor law. Although use of the injunction deprives the
defendant of a jury trial, and although punishment for contempt is sadly lacking
in definite standards, the scope of injunctive relief should not be restricted by
an arbitrary distinction between property rights and personal rights in an important and growing class of cases where such relief is often the sole remedy.
The other criteria for equitable relief, if adhered to, provide adequate safeguards
against abuse. In the instant case-a substantial right was clearly threatened.
The asked-for relief was practicable and endangered no constitutional freedoms.
The remedy at law could not adequately recompense the plaintiff for the mental
injury suffered in being ejected from the turf club.
The holding of the California Court that personal rights in proper cases are
entitled to the protection of equity in view of the inappropriate nature of the
remedy at law provides an important precedent in cases involving discrimination against minority groups.

ENFORCEABLE OBLIGATION AS REQUIREMENT
FOR VALID TRUST
The plaintiff executed a trust deed conveying real property to himself as
trustee for the benefit of his wife and children. As trustee he had full discretion
over the use and disposition of the property, including the privilege of reconveying the property to himself personally after his youngest child reached the
age of twenty-one. The beneficiaries were to enjoy only such benefits as he chose
to confer on them at his discretion. Subsequently, a divorce decree awarded
part of the real property involved in the trust deed to the plaintiff's wife. The
plaintiff brought an action to quiet title in himself as trustee, claiming that the
court in the divorce action lacked jurisdiction over the property because the
trustee was not before the court. Because the trust deed imposed no enforceable
obligation on the trustee and gave him absolute and unconditional discretion
with respect to the property, it was held that it was invalid, and that no trust
was created. Ponzelino v. Ponzelino.'
A valid trust requires a division of the interests in the trust property between
a trustee, who usually holds legal title, and one.or more beneficiaries, whose interests in the property, under the trust instrument, are enforceable by a court of
pressed by the plaintiff's suggestion that if equity would safeguard their right to sell bananas

it ought to be at least equally solicitous of their personal liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. We believe the true rule to be that equity will protect personal rights by injunction upon
the same conditions upon which it will protect property rights by injunction ..... "Kenyon v.
City of Chicopee, 70 N.E. 2d 241, 244 (Mass., 1946).
1 26 N.W. 2d 330 (Iowa, 1947).

